Comparative Philosophy Volume 7, No. 1 (2016): 90-95
Open Access / ISSN 2151-6014
www.comparativephilosophy.org

RECENT WORK
BOOK REVIEW ON
THE PHILOSOPHICAL CHALLENGE FROM CHINA (EDITED BY BRIAN BRUYA)
HANS VAN EYGHEN
1. INTRODUCTION
The Philosophical Challenge from China (Bruya 2015a) aims at enriching western
philosophy with Chinese thought. In the introduction, Brian Bruya laments about the
lack of interest in Chinese philosophers, claiming that “a minor Western philosopher
such as Anselm garners more attention in PHD programs than the entire Chinese
tradition combined” (Bruya 2015b: xv). Bruya’s claim is hard to verify, but a
comparison between the search results from Google Scholar for Western philosophers
like Aristotle (975,000), Willard Van Orman Quine (166,000) and Anselm (183,000) to
those for Chinese philosophers like Confucius (114,000), Mencius (26,200) and
Zhuang Zi (19,300) signals that he has a point.1 In order to mend this lacuna, 13
contributors were invited to discuss topics that are recognizable to philosophers
working in one of the many subfields of analytic philosophy in relation to Chinese
thought. According to Bruya, enriching Western philosophy can come in a number of
ways. He writes: “[I]t [Chinese philosophy] would advance the current discussion (…)
[by] supporting a minority view with a pervasive new argument, contradicting a
prominent position, and (…) demonstrating that the issue has a significant dimension
that has been neglected (…).” (Bruya 2015b: xv) The remainder of the book shows that
‘bringing the current philosophical discussion to a higher level’ should be added to
bruya’s list.
Bruya also briefly discusses a familiar worry of comparative philosophers, namely
that Western categories are forced upon Chinese thought and Chinese philosophy is
thereby assimilated to Western concerns. Bruya responds that the book is categorized
using human issues and not particularly Western or Chinese issues (Bruya 2015b). The
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division of chapters under the headers “moral psychology”, “political philosophy and
ethics” and “metaphysics and epistemology”, raises doubts whether this is indeed the
case. None of the three can properly be called human issues and clearly seem to be
Western categories. It is doubtful that non-western philosophers will adhere to a clear
cut distinction between “moral psychology” and “ethics” (Mencius for example likely
will not) or between “ethics” and “metaphysics” (Daoists likely will not). Some
scholars will object to this approach but it is fairly similar to the way ancient and
medieval philosophers are treated in present-day analytic philosophy. Modern Western
categories are also different from ancient and medieval categories to some extent but
current analytic philosophers are able to do justice to the thought of Aristotle, Aquinas
or Anselm within modern categories. Although something might be lost, this approach
is warranted because there is no real alternative.
2. MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
The first paper addresses psychological bias in judging one’s own character compared
to judging someone else’s (Sarkissian 2015). Hagop Sarkissian cites Susan Wolf who
argues that giving others the benefit of the doubt is a disposition of the moral saint.
Giving other the benefit of the doubt should be understood as being charitable in
judging others and refraining from blaming. Sarkissian finds a predecessor of Wolf’s
ideas in Confucius’ analects. In it, Confucius holds that when explaining another’s
behavior, one ought to look beyond that person’s motivations and character traits to
external contextual factors that could explain her behavior. According to Confucius,
judging others less harshly will have positive effects on the judging subject itself.
Many psychological experiments show that people tend not to be moral saints and
judge others much more harshly than they judge themselves. Nonetheless, game theory
teaches us that giving others the benefit of the doubt will be beneficial in the long run
and thus seems to provide support for Confucius’ claim.
David B. Wong has Mencius’ conception of moral sprouts and their developments
weigh in on the Western discussion over the role of emotion and reason in virtue ethics
(Wong 2015). Wong’s paper is a clear example of how Chinese thought can provide
new arguments for a minority position in Western philosophy. Mencius’ ideas put the
emphasis on the pre-theoretical, and thus the emotional aspects of moral life rather than
on the rational aspects. From the emotional aspects, “patterns of suffering” emerge. In
order to be mindful of the patterns of suffering, persons should weigh their reasons, so
Mencius’ account is not wholly emotional. With his paper, Wong succeeds in bringing
the debate between emotional and rational accounts of virtue ethics to a higher level by
showing how Mencius’ ideas assign a role to both. Mencius’ view can still be counted
among the emotional accounts but his ideas can aid in overcoming the standoff
between both sides of the debate.
Bongrae Seok also discusses Mencius’ moral psychology (Seok 2015). Seok claims
that Mencius’ ideas can enrich moral psychology because he takes the role of the body
serious. His ideas on empathy are connected to recent scientific insights in mirror
neurons and considered as an instance of care ethics. It would have been helpful to
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connect his insights with the current philosophical debate over moral intuitionism but
Seok convincingly shows how Chinese thought can be useful for understanding
scientific advances in morality.
3. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND ETHICS
The part on political philosophy and ethics is certainly the most controversial and
thought-provoking of the book. Tongdong Bai critiques the views of John Rawls on
‘decent hierarchical societies’ (Bai 2015). A decent hierarchical society does not treat
all persons as free and equal citizens but holds that one group or one religion can hold
the upper positions of political authority. Bai opposes Rawls’ condescending tone
when arguing that a liberal democracy should merely tolerate decent hierarchical
societies. He argues that modern liberal democracies do not deserve the moral high
ground assigned to them by Rawls. The general public suffers from political ignorance
to a large extent and this is mainly because modern liberal democracies have become
too large and diverse to function properly. Bai offers an alternative, Confu-China.
Confu-China is a hypothetical decent consultation hierarchy based on Confucian ideas.
Confu-China recognizes most basic liberties liberal democracies have, but differs on
the role of the state (the state is responsible for the well-being of the people). A more
radical change in Confu-China is the organization of elections; elections in ConfuChina abandon the ‘one man one vote’-system and opt for a competence-based system.
Bai thus does not give new arguments for a minority view in Western philosophy; he
rather gives arguments for a non-existing view in current Western political philosophy.
This can only help to make the philosophical discussion even broader.
Donald Munro follows a similar line of reasoning when arguing for unequal moral
worth (Munro 2015). He surveys the history of the western idea of equality from Plato
to Rawls and contrasts it to the Analects of Confucius. According to Munro, the
Confucian tradition asserts that filiality is the basis of virtue. The result is that family
members have more value to an individual than outsiders. Modern psychology suggests
that people indeed feel closer ties towards their kin than towards others. According to
Munro, there is no real alternative for grounding moral judgments than in emotions, so
modern psychology vindicates the Confucian position. Munro thus also gives
arguments for a view that is virtually non-existing in Western moral philosophy.
Stephen Angle takes a more conciliatory approach than the previous two articles
and paves the way for a dialogue between Aristotelian/ Humean virtue ethics and Mou
Zongsan’s views on self-restriction (Angle 2015). Mou argued that individual should
restrict their ethical judgment to make political and legal authority possible. According
to Angle, the idea of self-restriction can help in overcoming problems in Aristotle’s
and Hume’s account of virtue ethics. The problem is that both Aristotle and Hume
agree that virtues should be cultivated by individuals and are thus to a large extent
particular. Both also share the idea that laws of states are universal and hence there is a
conflict between both. When particular virtues are restricted in the political realm, the
problem can be overcome. Angle’s article raises a lot of issues, like when is self-
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restriction appropriate and when not, but shows that Chinese thought can help in
overcoming long-standing problems in Western philosophy.
Kong-loi Shun discusses ethical self-commitment by considering the Confucian
understanding of yi (Shun 2015). In later Confucian thought, yi means distancing
oneself from situations that can be ethically tainting and correcting such situations
when they arrive. Yi puts the focus on the self rather than on others in ethical situations.
Shun thoroughly elaborates on how yi can be relevant for thinking about morality but
his article misses an engagement with the philosophical discussion on this subject. It
would have been interesting to let the idea weigh in on Western virtue ethics or moral
character building.
Owen Flanagan and Steven Geisz’s paper discusses an important question in
current metaethics, namely the question how to ground morality (Flanagan and Geisz
2015). Western metaethics has long struggled to ground morality without invoking a
transcendent, personal God who created the moral law. A number of authors like
Charles Taylor and Alasdair Macintyre even argued that such a project is doomed to
fail. Flanagan and Geisz claim that classical Confucianism is a clear example of a
serious moral tradition without any foundation in a God. Flanagan and Geisz argue that
the whole debate over the need for God in Western metaethics arises out of the
particular history of the West. Without settling the debate, their paper shows the
importance of historical contingent factors in some philosophical debates. These
factors are often neglected in analytic philosophy.
4. METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY
The final part may be less controversial but also highlights some major differences
between Western and Chinese thought. Philip Ivanhoe discusses views of Chinese neoConfucian thinkers about oneness (Ivanhoe 2015). In the West, some medieval mystics
wrote about feelings of oneness but the theme is largely absent from Western
philosophy. In Chinese philosophy oneness plays a much more prominent role.
Ivanhoe discusses several senses of oneness. He believes oneness can be useful for
understanding empathy and altruism. Considering the self as an expanded self can do a
much better job of explaining these phenomena than the traditional Western atomized
conception of the self. Ivanhoe does not develop his view of the expanded self much
further. This would probably have been another challenge to Western philosophy.
Brook Ziporyn mounts an all-out attack on one of the central elements of
traditional Western logic, namely the law of non-contradiction (Ziporyn 2015).
Whereas most philosophers in the West take the law of non-contradiction as an
unavoidable starting point or a basic truth, it enjoys no such status in the East. Many
Buddhist schools of thought explicitly deny the law of non-contradiction. Very recently,
Western philosophers like Graham Priest have taken up their ideas. Whereas Priest’s
discussion was largely limited to the Buddhist distinction between conventional and
ultimate truths, Ziporyn focus on one Chinese Buddhist school, the Tian-Tai, which
expanded on epistemological ideas of Zhuang Zi. Although the subject matter is
complex, Ziporyn succeeds in tilting the discussion to a higher level than that of
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Graham Priest and provides a powerful challenge to the predominance of the law of
non-contradiction.
Another defense of a minority view with new Chinese arguments is Stephen
Hetherington and Karyn Lai’s defense of prioritizing knowing-how over knowing-that
(Hetherington and Lai 2015). The priority of knowing-that over knowing-how was
already criticized by Gilbert Ryle in the 1940s. Hetherington and Lai agree that
knowing-how cannot be reduced to knowing-that and expand knowing-how to include
knowing-to; a way of knowing aimed at a certain goal, for example knowing how to
choose the right words for calming a group. For this purpose, they use a Chinese text,
the Lü-Shi-Chun-Qiu, as a resource. In their conclusion, Hetherington and Lai voice
the hope that Western epistemology can be expanded to include a richer concept of
knowing.
Of all the contributions to the volume, Bo Mou’s constructive engagement between
Willard Van Orman Quine’s naturalized epistemology and Zhuang Zi’s Daoist
naturalism (Mou 2015) devotes most time to the question whether a dialogue between
East and West is possible. He claims that before we can have a constructive
engagement, we first need clarity about what kind of naturalism we are talking about.
When we understand naturalism as liberal naturalism, which allows for some
nonscientific and non-physical aspects of nature, a bridge can be built. With this bridge
in place, Quine’s naturalized epistemology can be enriched by Zhuang Zi on the issue
of naturalism and normativity and on the relationship of philosophical inquiry to
science.
Brian Bruya discusses the relevance of Xun Zi and Zhuang Zi for the philosophical
discussion of action without agency (Bruya 2015c). The discussion rose to prominence
by the works of Harry Frankfurt who argued that humans are only responsible for their
actions if they know their reasons for action. Others have pointed out that people often
engage in actions in an unreflective automatic way and are thus unable to give reasons
for these actions. Yet we often hold people responsible for these actions. Bruya argues
that Chinese philosophers do not face the same issues because they view natural human
action as an ideal and natural human action is often unreflective and automatic. Bruya
suggests that both views can be combined in a unified theory of human action.
However, it is hard to see what the unified theory would look like since both positions
are very different and Bruya does not give this unified theory.
5. SUMMARY
The philosophical challenge from China shows that Western philosophy can certainly
be enriched and often challenged by Chinese thought. The quality of the papers ranges
from good to excellent. Readers who expect general information about Chinese
philosophers will be disappointed but this was never a goal of the book. The book can
be of interest to philosophers in many subfields and to anyone who is open to nonWestern ideas.
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